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Veil Bans in Western Europe: Interpreting Policy Diffusion examines the diffusion of 
Muslim veil-ban laws in four Western European countries within the last decade; France, 
Belgium, Italy and the Netherlands. Nationwide bans on full-face Muslim veiling are rooted in 
several systemic, normative, and political accounts and advocated by contrasting political 
ideologies. Methodologically, this paper employs an integrative perspective to explain the 
process of diffusion in some countries but not in others, by exploring both external and internal 
factors that led to policy innovation. Overall, full-face Muslim veil bans in Western Europe have 
been intended to accelerate cultural integration of minorities to European values and traditions, 
but have been challenged by Muslim minorities in the region and their rights of expression and 
religion. 
 




Within the first decade of this millennium, several Western European countries 
introduced Muslim veil-ban legislation in public schools and/or at local levels through city 
ordinances. Starting with France in 2010, nationwide bans on full-face Muslim veils were also 
adopted in Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands. Despite some controversy, bans on Muslim veils 
were supported overwhelmingly by political parties and the public, were rooted on several 
accounts, and advocated by contrasting political ideologies. From the left, veil bans were 
justified by the concept of secularism or the exclusion of religion from the public sphere, and by 
the fact that these bans served to safeguard women’s rights. From the right, Muslim veils were 
regarded as a symbol of Islamic fundamentalism and were thus a threat to national/regional 
security. In addition, legal bans were justified on the basis of cultural integration or assimilation 
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This paper will examine the diffusion of full-face Muslim veil-ban laws in France, 
Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands and will employ both external and internal determinants to 
explain this process. In the first case, it will examine factors that have influenced Western 
Europe systemically including immigration of people of Muslim origin; issues of 
regional/national security, particularly since 9/11; and a greater sense of a common European 
identity or Europeanism. Internally, this paper will analyze the political and social forces 
(political parties, institutions, and civil society) that have contributed to the adoption of policies 
in these four Western European countries. Overall, this integrative approach will shed light on 
how the external environment helped shape the internal policy-making processes in some 
countries but not in others. 
 
 
Innovation-Diffusion Frameworks: Internal and External Determinants 
Among political scientists generally, policy diffusion is a well-known contemporary 
approach for studying public policy, as demonstrated in Paul Sabatier’s Theories of Policy 
Process. Over time, the framework has been refined both conceptually and methodologically. In 
the fifth edition of Diffusion of Innovations, Everett Rogers defines diffusion as a process in 
which members of a social system communicate innovations (2003:11). Policy diffusion 
typically refers to the process by which policymakers learn from the experiences of others and 
attempt to imitate their innovations or avoid them (Guenther 2008:58). This process “involves a 
set of assumptions about the nature of systems, how they interact, and how the environmental 
context will affect the units studied” (Starr 1991:367). The framework also examines how policy 
spreads from one country to another, and involves geographic and other structural factors to help 
explain it (Freeman & Tester 1996:13). Emanuel Adler (1991:51) observes that “there is a 
dynamic relationship between historical and structural forces that helps explain the nature of the 
diffusion of values.” Adler identifies this dynamic process as “cognitive evolution.” The author 
suggests that because “our ideas, beliefs, and behaviors are learned from other people,” 
collective learning will be closely related to the ability of groups to convey their experiences to 
other groups. 
As to the level of analysis, earlier works on diffusion showed a divide between scholars 
that identified internal factors as critical in policy diffusion and those who placed greater weight 
on external influences or the contagion effect of diffusion (Gray 1994, McClendon and Hearn 
2006). Yet, recent literature suggests that a comprehensive approach to studying the diffusion of 
norms, values and policy should include a combination of external and internal determinants, 
bridging the artificial gap between what occurs within a state and outside of it (True and 
Mintrom 2001, Mintrom and Vegari 1991). This literature employed both internal 
determinants—organizational resources, institutions, political actors—and external factors—
regional or international trends or demands—to explain the processes leading to the diffusion of 
policy (Piatti-Crocker 2010 and 2011, Guenther 2008). Increasingly those perspectives have also 
claimed that states learn and become embedded in global norms, which help shape their domestic 
behavior and more particularly the conduct toward their citizens. Norms and practices are then 
transmitted from one individual to another or from one state to another with important political 
implications (Florini 1996). 
Following this latter integrative interpretation, this paper will deal with both dimensions 
of policy diffusion by emphasizing the international/regional process through global and regional 
socialization and briefly describing the internal factors that led some Western European countries 
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to adopt full-face veil-ban legislation. Whereas political parties and public opinion in France, 
Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands played a significant role in the adoption of bans on Muslim 
veils, immigration of people from Muslim origin and security concerns within the context of 
Europeanism helped shape the external process that led to the diffusion of full-face veil-ban 
policies in the region. 
 
 
The Controversy over Muslim Veils 
There are different forms of Muslim veiling. Burqas (also spelled burkas) and niqabs 
refer to a piece of clothing which Muslim women wear to cover their faces. A burqa hides the 
entire face including eyes, while a niqab conceals the entire face but leaves the eyes exposed. 
Hijab refers to Muslim veils that envelop the hair and head, but not the face. In the literature it is 
sometimes refer to as “Muslim headscarf.” In this paper, “Muslim full face-veils” or “Muslim 
face-covering veils” refer to burqas or niqabs. 
Muslim full-face veils are controversial even among European Muslims. Most of them 
believe that Sharia, or Islamic law, mandates women to cover their bodies, but allows keeping 
their faces, hands and feet uncovered (hijab). Only a few Muslim women wear full-face veils, 
and most Muslims and non-Muslims alike do not approve of face-covering veiling. However, as 
this paper will be show, burqa bans spread in some European countries and provoked heated 
debates about the nature of democracy, European identity, the rights of non-Christian immigrants 
and immigrant women in particular. Indeed, the adoption of full-face veil bans in Europe is 
puzzling. If these types of veiling are widely unpopular among European Muslims, why were 
they also the source of significant public debate and a key concern in European electoral 
campaigns? If wearing full-face veiling is not a requirement in Islam, why is there resistance on 
the part of the European Muslim community to implementing the ban? And if European 
governments claim that veil bans are aimed at providing security, then why are bans against 
other face-covering clothing not enforced with the same vigor? Finally, if these bans are 
enforced to maintain secularism, why do governments not implement these bans for all religious 
symbols or other forms of veiling? The next section will deal with these controversies and the 




Diffusion of Muslim Veil Bans: External Determinants 
Several external factors have contributed to the diffusion of full-face bans in Western 
Europe. Indeed, the process of policy innovation in this case was shaped to a great extent by 
systemic and normative factors. This section will examine some of these most relevant factors, 
including Muslim immigration in Western Europe, the issue of security and the ensuing 
identification of Muslims with terrorism, and the normative ideology of Europeanism and full-
faced veiling as a threat to such identity. 
 
Muslim Immigration: Recent Waves 
Within the past 60 years, Muslims began to migrate into Europe in massive numbers in 
response to economic problems at home and the post-World War II economic boom in Europe. 
Migrants from North Africa, South Asia, and Eurasia came originally as “temporary workers” 
rather than settlers and occupied labor positions rejected by Europeans that “otherwise would 
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have remained vacant or else commanded higher salaries” (Leiken 2012:92). The newcomers 
benefited employers and other European citizens wishing to maintain high standards of living 
and helped build railroads, mine coal, clean streets, and work on jobs that most Europeans did 
not want to perform (Ural Manço 2008). 
Yet, the economic downturn of the 1970s made many immigrants jobless but also 
unwilling to return home. As a result, European officials began enforcing immigration policies 
that were more restrictive, introducing measures that by the mid-1970s were intended to deter 
newcomers and halt recruitment of foreign labor. Migration of foreign workers dwindled due to 
these measures; yet, migrants residing in Europe were able to sponsor family reunification. 
Ironically, in the decades after those restrictive policies on immigration were enforced, more 
migrants went to Europe, probably due to fear that these strict policies could become even 
harsher in the future (David 2009). 
Since the 1970s, several strategies to slow immigration flows have been implemented in 
Europe. Some governments have sought to discourage new migrants from coming to Europe by 
improving the life conditions in their countries of origin through foreign aid or foreign direct 
investment. Others have tried to discourage immigration by portraying miserable conditions for 
newcomers in their potentially adoptive countries. For example, in 2007 Spain ran an ad 
campaign in West Africa warning Africans not to risk their lives in “futile illegal immigration” 
(BBC 2010). 
More recently, policies of integration have been implemented in several European 
countries. The Netherlands now requires newer (less than 8 years) and younger (under 65 years 
of age) immigrants to take a course on “integration” and pay a fee of about 350 euros for the 
course. Additionally, unemployment benefits are denied to full-face veil wearers. According to 
Mostapha el-Filali, a government official in the Netherlands, “this is our best solution for people 
unemployed,” stating, “If these women are not open to the chance to find a job, then, they 
assume the consequences” (Kovacs 2006). Absorption has been difficult for Muslim immigrants 
as well. Immigration typically moves families, rather than individuals, and these carry 
attachments—customs, traditions, values, and creeds generally seen as un-European, as defined 
in the next section. 
Some 20 million Muslims live currently in the EU or nearly 5 percent of its population. 
In France, the Muslim population (primarily Algerian and Moroccan) reaches 7 percent. Muslims 
are the majority of immigrants elsewhere in Europe, including Belgium, Italy, and the 
Netherlands. Even though mechanisms to absorb immigrants have varied throughout Europe, 
immigration of Muslims is viewed “grudgingly, even resentfully” throughout the region (Leiken 
2012). 
 
The Security Question: Muslims in Europe Post-9/11 
The terrorist attacks of 9/11 in the United States and later in London and Madrid 
highlighted and added a new dimension to questions regarding the presence of European Muslim 
communities across Europe (Ethnobarometer 2011). Since then, the issue of security has been at 
the top of the agenda for European policymakers including the adoption of full-face veil-ban 
laws, which were rooted, at least initially, in national security concerns. 
Although not the sole cause of radicalization and terrorism, some experts believe that past 
failures to fully integrate Muslims into mainstream European society may have lead some 
Muslims in Europe to become more vulnerable to extremist ideologies. At the same time, 
European governments have also sought to strengthen security measures and tighten immigration 
19 
Journal of International Women’s Studies  Vol. 16, No. 2  January 2015 
and asylum policies to prevent radicalization and combat terrorism. Throughout Europe, those in 
favor of the bans claimed that since face coverings hinder identification and have been used 
occasionally to commit crimes, banning them seemed a reasonable and efficient way to prevent 
criminal or terrorist activities. According to a Belgian MP, the introduction of a full-face veil ban 
in Belgium was not “about introducing any form of discrimination,” but “aimed at forcing people 
to make themselves identifiable.” After all, several countries have implemented laws that require 
visible faces in public, according to supporters of veil bans, and have nothing to do with burqas 
or indeed religion. As a Dutch government spokesman put it, “It’s a safety measure: you don’t 
see who’s in it” (Salton 2010). Some opposition to this security concern was evident in Europe, 
since women are not really seen as a threat to the community, and a law forbidding the wearing 
of full-faced veils seems too intrusive for European democracies (Salton, 2010). 
Finally, as discussed later in the paper, a very small percentage of Muslim women wear 
face-covering veils in Western Europe; the majority of Muslim women, if veiled, wear hijabs. 
Yet, the issue of security particularly after 9/11 was appealing to a majority of Europeans and to 
government officials who used this discourse to justify veil bans in their countries. 
 
Europeanism and Veil Bans 
The concept of “Europe” as a unique identity is very old; most historians placed it around 
the 5
th
 century BC when the Greeks settled in the Ionian Islands. However, it was not until 1945 
and particularly since the Maastricht agreement of 1993 that created the European Union (EU) 
when the concept of a European identity became a more cohesive term.  John McCormick claims 
that there are political, economic, and social norms and values identified with Europe and 
Europeans. He argues that despite major hurdles associated with European integration and the 
work of the European Union, and persistent residual identities within states and nations, 
Europeans shared several common principles, primarily those identified with secularism and 
cosmopolitanism (McCormick 2012). 
Secularism is probably the one quality most clearly associated with Europe. Indeed, 
whereas religion and religious fanaticism continue to grow in many parts of the world, in Europe 
religion is declining, and it plays an increasingly marginal role in politics and public life. It is 
this unique concept of secularism where European and Muslim identities are at odds. In France, 
for example, secularism or the principle of laïcité has a strong historical and republican tradition 
that goes back to philosophical views of French revolutionaries against those of the ancièn 
regime (monarchists), the latter backed by the Catholic Church. Yet, laïcité does not impinge on 
one’s individual rights since freedom of religion in the private sphere is still protected; it merely 
seeks to regulate the presence of religion in the public sphere. Beyond France and throughout 
Western Europe, secularism with its varied interpretations is a shared European value, whereas 
the Muslim religion is regarded as a threat against this principle (Bowen 2010). 
Cosmopolitanism, or the concept associated with universal ideas, is the belief that all 
Europeans, and possibly even all humans, belong to a single moral community that transcends 
state boundaries or national identities; thus, the local and the global cannot be separated or 
divorced (Habermas and Derrida 2003). According to this view, human rights are universal, 
rather than local or relative. Former president of the Czech Republic Václav Havel (1994) 
claimed that Europeanism included basic human rights such as “respect for the unique human 
being, and for humanity’s freedom, right and dignity, the principle of solidarity, the rule of law 
and equality before the law,” among others. 
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In this sense, both cosmopolitanism and secularism are prevalent European values. 
Indeed, according to Eurobarometer, when Europeans were asked which values best represented 
the European Union the list was topped by peace (39%), democracy (38%), and human rights 
(38%), whereas respect for other cultures was recognized by only 17%, tolerance by 10% and 
religion by 3% of Europeans (Standard Eurobarometer 2012). Concerning Muslim face-covering 
veil bans, European values were the normative justification for these policies; the principles of 
cosmopolitanism, or the belief in universal human rights and more particularly women’s rights, 
and secularism, or the exclusion of religion from public spaces were used to justify full-face veil-
ban policies. 
Overall, the external determinants discussed in this section helped shape the internal 
processes that led to the adoption of veil-bans in certain countries. The section below will 




Internal Determinants: The Adoption of Muslim Veil-Bans in Belgium, France, Italy, and 
the Netherlands 
It is noteworthy that the debates leading to full-face veil bans in Western Europe were 
both substantively similar and well-synchronized, adding importance to the diffusion explanation 
and its timing. In 2003 debates over the new law to ban religious symbols (including Muslim 
full-face veils) in French public schools provoked Muslim veil discussions in other European 
countries (Ganley 2003, Borowiec 2004). In addition, when in October 2003 France considered a 
ban on Muslim veils in public schools, other European countries also debated whether they 
should adopt similar laws (BBC 2003). Italy was the first country to ban Muslim full-face veils 
through city ordinances. France was the first country to ban similar veils through a national law 
in 2010. In all cases, bills were initiated by the political right but later became popular among 
other parties and the general public. This section explores the internal factors (political parties, 
governmental branches, public opinion, and ultimately the legislature) that led to the adoption of 
veil bans in France, Belgium, Italy, and the Netherlands. 
 
Laïcité and Veil Bans in France 
France has the largest Muslim population in Western Europe, but a minute percentage of 
Muslim women wear full-face veils (Cody 2010, Davies 2010).
4
 Yet, according to French 
authorities, the number of women wearing full-face veiling is growing in France; most of them 
are young, two-thirds of them are French citizens, and around a quarter of them are converts 
(The Economist 2010). 
Veil bans in France are rooted in the principle of secularism or laïcité discussed in the 
previous section. Formally, France was secularized in 1905 with the adoption of legislation that 
sought to exclude religion to secure democracy. Since then, laïcité has been intended to regulate 
the presence of religion in the public sphere without impinging on the right of individuals to 
exercise their religious preferences in the private sphere. 
 Based on laïcité, France has been debating Muslim veils since the late 1980s, with these 
debates regaining prominence after 2001 when some Muslim girls were expelled from public 
schools for refusing to remove their veils (Ganley 2003).  Yet, until 2004, the decision to allow 
Muslim headscarves in schools was left to the discretion of school authorities, and Muslim 
                                                          
4
 Only around 700 women of a total 5 million Muslims wear full-faced veils in France. 
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headscarves for public servants were outlawed by an administrative regulation, but rarely 
enforced. 
In 2004, the government introduced legislation that would ban wearing any religious 
symbols, including Jewish skullcaps, large Christian crosses and Muslim veils in public schools 
(Ganley 2003, Lewis 2004, Borowiec 2004). However, the law banned only large religious 
symbols, thus “discreet” symbols, such as small crosses were tolerated. The government argued 
that the goal of this law was to reinforce secular principles of the French Republic and to counter 
Islamic fundamentalists. Supporters of the ban claimed that the new policy would create a 
religiously-neutral educational environment for students of diverse backgrounds and was aimed 
at the classic French tradition of “assimilation” in an attempt to integrate students of different 
religious beliefs into French secular society (Lorentzsen 2004). The law was controversial 
among religious faiths and the public but received the support of a majority of the French people. 
Indeed, a survey conducted soon after the law was adopted showed that 80% of those polled 
were in favor of the ban and this support included 44% of Muslim girls (BBC Monitoring 
International Reports 2006). 
 
Muslim Full-Face Veil Ban in Public Places: Policy Innovation Beyond Public Schools 
Driven by overwhelming public support, former President Nicholas Sarkozy set up a 32-
member panel of experts to study a nationwide full-face ban in public spaces in 2009. The panel 
declared that face-covering veiling was “a sign of subservience [and] debasement” (Davies 
2010). The committee recommended banning veils in public buildings, schools, and public 
transportation and denying public services to those who refused to abide by the ban. It also 
suggested refusing asylum or citizenship to full-face veiled women, considering coercion to wear 
face-covering veils as a reason for asylum requests, issuing a parliamentary resolution 
denouncing Muslim full-face veils and creating a national school of Islamic studies (“France 
MP’s report backs Muslim face veil bans” 2010, Davies 2010a, Bremner 2010). Less than a year 
later, the French Parliament issued a report recommending a ban on face-covering veiling in 
hospitals, schools, government offices and public transportation, although women were still 
allowed to wear full-face veiling on the streets.  It was suggested that any person with visible 
signs of “radical religious practices” contradicted the “republican principles of French 
secularism” (BBC News 2010). 
Similar to attitudes towards the ban in public schools, French opinion polls indicated that 
a majority of the French people supported a veil ban, and this included Muslim feminists (Ni 
Putes Ni Soumises) and prominent imams, as they regarded veils to be a sign of Islamic 
fundamentalism (Davies 2010, Cody 2010) and against Europeanism. Yet, French socialists and 
the Muslim Council and religious groups were opposed to the legislation. They feared that a ban 
would discriminate against Muslim women and would be regarded as an attack against the 
Islamic community (Crumley 2010). 
Despite these concerns, the bill proposed by the government was adopted 
overwhelmingly by Frances’s National Assembly (335 to 1 votes in favor) and the Senate (246 to 
1 votes in favor) and entered into force in April 2011. According to the law, forcing a woman to 
wear a veil is punishable by up to a year in prison or a 15,000-euro fine. However, French police 
have been cautious in enforcing the law fearing violent reactions. Indeed, “police admitted that 
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they feared being accused of discrimination against Muslims” and would not arrest women “in or 
around” mosques.”5 
In 2013, a burqa-related incident led to two-days of rioting in a banlieue near Paris, when 
a woman wearing a burqa refused to lift her veil after a policeman’s request. Socialist Minister of 
Interior Manuel Valls stated that the law “must be enforced everywhere,” arguing that it is “in 
the interest of women to protect them from those who try to impose other values” (The 
Economist 2013). In the meantime, several Muslim women have challenged the law for violating 
their human and religious rights.
6
 In the latter case, Muslim women have appealed to domestic 




Veil Bans in Belgium: From the Bottom Up 
There are around 4% of Muslims in Belgium, and some sources report that only a few 
dozen women wear full-face Muslim veils in the country (Serbian 2012, Cody 2010a, and 
Washington Post 2010). Nevertheless, local authorities in some Belgian townships introduced 
veil bans even before a nationwide policy was considered. In 2004, the city of Maaseik banned 
full-face veiling in public places, even though only six women were known to wear burqas in the 
city. According to Mayor Jan Creemers, veils “scare many people” because “in our Western 
culture people see each other face to face” (Bryant 2006). Following Maaseik, several other 
Belgian towns and numerous Belgian public schools introduced bans on all kinds of Muslim 
veils (Bryant 2006). 
Debates over a national Muslim veil ban began in 2009 when Filip Dewinter from the 
Vlaams Belang (right-wing) party of Belgium called hijabs “the propaganda weapon of choice 
for the establishment of Islamic society in Europe” and proposed to ban all veils in Flemish 
schools (West 2010). Dewinter claimed that unlike Christian crosses or Jewish yarmulkes, 
Muslim veils were “the flag of a political ideology” which aimed at “the realization of a 
theocratic society based on Sharia, or Islamic law” (West 2010). 
Nationally, a full-face veil ban bill was introduced by the center-right Reformist 
Movement Party in 2010 with the support of the Socialist Party and was aimed directly at 
banning Muslim clothing (The Economist 2010). Similar to France and the other Western 
European countries, bans were justified on the basis of national security and on European 
identity and values. Culturally, the country is also divided between Dutch speaking and French 
speaking regions, the latter notably more in favor of banning Muslim clothing.
8
 Despite voting 
almost unanimously in favor of a veil ban, parliament was dissolved before the bill became law. 
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 Adriana Piatti-Crocker and Laman Tasch. ( 2012). “Unveiling the Veil Ban Dilemma: Turkey and Beyond.” In 
Journal of International Women Studies. Vol. 13, 3:17-32 (July). 
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 In 2014, The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) upheld France’s burqa ban; the court’s ruling said that 
France's aim of improving social cohesion through the ban was legitimate. "The court was…able to accept that the 
barrier raised against others by a veil concealing the face was perceived by the respondent state as breaching the 
right of others to live in a space of socialization which made living together easier" 
http://online.wsj.com/articles/european-human-rights-court-upholds-frances-burqa-ban-1404210496 
8
 These riots followed a shooting of a Muslim neighbor by a mentally-ill white Belgian in December 2002. The 
incident took place in the city of Antwerp where a third of the non-Muslim voters supported the anti-immigration 
Vlaams Block Party, while a majority of Muslims favored the Arab European League, a radical organization 
demanding recognition of Arabic as Belgium’s fourth official language (Henley 2004). 
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A majority of Belgian Muslims did not favor or wear burqas or niqabs, but they also 
rejected the legal ban. For example, the Association of Belgian Muslims asserted that women in 
burqas may be required to remove their veils in order to be identified by the police or to be 
issued a driver’s license, but they argue that a ban would impinge on their religious or cultural 
freedoms (The Washington Post 2010). Isabelle Praille, Vice President of the Executive of 
Belgian Muslims, publicly condemned “both the notion of imposing and the notion of banning” 
(Daily News 2010). Other more radical organizations such as Sharia4Belgium supports Sharia 
law for Muslims,
9
 but this group represents a very small minority of Muslims in Belgium. 
In 2011, a second full-face veil-ban bill was introduced. As it had happened a year 
before, the bill was overwhelmingly supported by Belgium’s parliament and became law in May 
of that year. Similarly to the French law, in Belgium the ban punishes with fines and/or up to 
seven days’ imprisonment anyone caught in public places with their face completely or partially 
covered.
10
 Since the law was implemented, several appeals were filed with Belgium’s 
Constitutional Court. Claimants argued that the prohibition violated their constitutional rights 
including the principle of legality (or the requirement that laws should be clear, ascertainable and 
sufficiently precise), freedom of religion, and the right to non-discrimination. The Court rejected 
all these arguments save the proviso that the “burqa ban” “may not be applied in places of 
worship, as this would unduly restrict the freedom of religion” (Flo and Joghum 2013). 
 
The Northern League and Bans on Muslim Veils: The Case of Italy 
According to official data, there were only 1.5 million Muslims in Italy in 2005, or about 
3% of its total population. In addition, unlike other European countries where most Muslims 
arrived after World War II, in Italy, Muslims immigrated in the 1990s; few of them speak Italian 
and only 10% of the Muslim immigrants are Italian citizens (Eyal 2005, The Guardian 2005). 
As in Belgium, in Italy, full-face Muslim veil bans were debated within the framework of 
national security and were introduced primarily at local levels, in the Northern regions, where the 
country is politically controlled by the Northern League. Indeed, laws that ban covering the face 
in public (be it Muslim veils, Western veils, or motorcycles helmets) had been in place since 
1975 and in response to domestic terrorism (Ganley 2003). Rarely enforced before, this 
legislation was used more recently against Muslim women wearing full-face-covering veils in 
Northern Italy (Hooper 2010, Pisa 2009). 
Some Italian townships in Northern Italy began to adopt veil ban measures at the turn of 
the millennium. One such township was Azzano Decimo, where its mayor, Enzo Bortolotti, 
issued an ordinance banning anything that covered the face, including Muslim veils. The 
mayor’s official reason for the ban was “public safety” and to prevent international terrorism 
though critics were concerned that the ban’s real target were Muslim women wearing veils. 
Indeed, the mayor had used anti-immigrant and anti-Muslim discourse to justify the ban. He 
claimed, “I am not a racist…I only want to protect my own culture. I have no doubt that Italy's 
future will be one of a multiracial society. But people who come here must come with respect for 
our laws and traditions” (Johnston 2004). 
Other Northern cities followed similar policies and, in some cases, teachers wearing full-
face veils were required to remove them (Lewis 2004). The Northern League claimed that 
Muslim veils were unacceptable in Italy because Islamic culture was “historically antithetical” to 
                                                          
9
 See http://www.shariah4belgium.com. for more information on this organization. 
10
 Ibid, 3.  
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Italian culture (Lewis 2004); once again, values became the overarching justification for a ban on 
Muslim veils. 
As in the other three European countries discussed in this article, a national bill 
introduced in 2010 was supported overwhelmingly by the public, with more than 70% of those 
polled in favor of the ban. Yet, the Italian Muslim community was divided; some Italian Muslim 
groups opposed the ban as an attack on personal freedom, though they also encouraged women 
not to wear full-face veils (Daily Mail 2010). Others claimed that women should have the 
freedom to choose how to dress (Hooper 2010). Moreover, penalizing women for wearing 
Muslim veils was seen as discriminatory and as punishing the entire Muslim community (Hooper 
2010). 
The national bill amends the 1975 legislation adding specific provisions on Muslim full-
face veil bans (Pisa 2009). The Minister for Equal Opportunities, Mara Carfagna, argued that the 
ban was aimed at protecting “the dignity and rights of immigrant women” (Daily Mail 2010). 
She claimed that full-face veils were not considered to be religious symbols by top Islamic 
authorities in Paris and Cairo. Italian supporters of the ban also claimed that even Middle Eastern 
feminists and intellectuals have viewed Muslim veils as a sign of women’s oppression. 
 As with other European veil bans, the Italian bill mandates women who wear full-face 
Muslim veils to remove their veils in public places when required by police (UAE 2010). The 
bill provides for both fines and imprisonment if veils are not removed. In addition, like the 
French law, the Italian bill punishes more severely those who “force someone to wear a burqa or 
face veils using either physical or psychological violence” (Pisa 2011). Less than a year after the 
national bill was introduced, the Italian parliamentary commission approved a draft of the bill 
that not only prohibits Muslim veils but also other face-covering items such as masks in public 
places (The Washington Post 2011). The question here is whether the ban will be fairly 
implemented against all who cover their faces or will target more often women wearing full-face 
Muslim veils as was the case with the 1975 law. 
 
The Far-Right Party and “Burqa” Bans in the Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, Muslims account for about 6% of the population and, despite their 
diverse backgrounds, Muslims have been considered one single ethnic group since 2001 (Digital 
Journal 2012). Furthermore, among Muslims only between 100 and 400 women wear full-face 
Muslim veils (National Post 2012). 
Until recently, Muslim full-face veils were legal in the country and were accepted or at 
least tolerated by most of the public (The Economist 2013). Yet, public attitudes towards 
Muslims began to change after the 2002 assassination of right-wing politician Pim Fortuyn, who 
had called Islam “backward” and expressed his opposition to Muslim conservatism; yet, his 
assassin was not an Islamic radical. Still, Dutch people were concerned whether Muslims could 
tolerate criticism and adapt to liberal values. As a result, Dutch imams were mandated to attend 
classes on freedom of speech and religion, and a general debate on veil bans ensued (Henley 
2004). 
Bans on full-face veils were introduced in some public schools beginning in 2003. The 
Dutch parliament issued a report in 2004, which, similar to the ones in France and Italy, asserted 
that efforts to integrate Muslims to Dutch society were proven inefficient as rising Islamic 
fundamentalism had been experienced in the country (Henley 2004). A veil ban bill proposal by 
right-wing politician Geert Wilders followed the report. Wilders stated that “women walking the 
streets in a totally unrecognizable manner were an insult to everyone who believed in equal 
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rights” and saw the bill as “a comfort to moderate Muslims” and a “contribut[ion] to integration 
in the Netherlands” (Digital Journal 2012). However, change in the government-coalition 
prevented this bill from becoming law. 
Opposition to the veil-ban bill was made apparent by the justice ministry, among others, 
who discussed the discriminatory nature of the bill (Agence France Presse 2006). In addition, 
members of the Labor Party warned that a ban of this kind could be perceived as “Islam-
bashing” (Max 2006, Doward 2006). Others, like Amsterdam’s Mayor Job Cohen, were also 
concerned that the ban could provoke a backlash among Muslims and lead to an increase in the 
number of women wearing full-face veils (Max 2006, Doward 2006, Hudson 2006). 
By 2010, when many other European countries were considering veil-ban laws, the far-
right Dutch leader Geert Wilders insisted on the need to ban Muslim full-face veiling (Daily 
News 2010).  Wilders’ proposal was intended to ban only full-face Muslim veils and not other 
religious symbols. “This (ban) is not meant for crosses or yarmulkes because those are symbols 
of religions that belong to our own culture and are not—as is the case of headscarves—a sign of 
an oppressive totalitarian ideology” (West 2010). When the Freedom Party became the third 
largest party in the Dutch parliament, the Muslim veil-ban bill was considered once again 
(Waterfield 2011). In January 2012, the Dutch Cabinet of Ministers approved the bill and the law 
was adopted with overwhelming parliamentary support. The ban on full-face Muslim veils was 
first implemented in 2013. 
 
 
To Ban or Not to Ban? 
The previous section shows that the discourses on Muslim-veil bans in Belgium, France, 
Italy and Netherlands echoed each other; policy-makers and public opinion in these countries 
seem to take notice of policies or events occurring in other countries. In most of these case-
studies Muslim veils were initially banned along with other pieces of clothing covering the face 
and were rooted primarily on security concerns. At the same time, bans were enforced only 
against women wearing Muslim veils rather than other religious clothing. Additionally, bill 
proposals to ban Muslim veils were initiated by right-wing political forces, leading to link these 
veil-bans to growing racism and xenophobia. The center and center-left in most cases would later 
join forces to ban full-face veils, justifying these policies on women’s rights, on the fact that 
veils represent an unacceptable tradition that perpetuates women’s repression, and on secularism, 
or the exclusion of religion from public spaces. The Muslim community remained divided on 
this issue: although in all the countries discussed in this paper, Muslim authorities stated that 
Muslim veils were not required by Islam, most did not endorse the bans either. Besides, women 
with veils justify wearing them by reference to Islamic texts. 
Despite this trend, it is also noteworthy that bans proposed around the same time in other 
Western European countries were rejected either by their legislatures or courts of law. This 
shows that despite similar external developments, internal factors are critical regarding whether 
policy innovation will or will not be adopted. For example, in 2010 the right-wing Progress Party 
introduced a full-face Muslim veil-ban bill in Norway’s Parliament. Yet, a coalition of 
opposition parties rejected the proposal and the bill was never debated. Jan Tore Sanner, deputy 
leader for the Conservative Party argued that “All repression must be combated but by means of 
open debate, not with sanctions that affect the victims” (The Foreigner 2010). Similarly in 2010, 
Denmark’s ruling party proposed legislation banning full-face Muslim veils with the explicit 
support of M. Lars Loekke Rasmussen, then Prime Minister, who argued that burqas and niqabs 
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did not have a place in Danish society. Yet, Parliament later rejected the legislation (Alaez 
Corral 2013). Furthermore, in the Spanish Northeastern region of Catalonia, more than a dozen 
cities adopted burqa bans in 2010 and there was also consideration of a nationwide ban during 
the same year. The national bill promoted by the Conservative Partido Popular (PP) was 
rejected by a majority of Spanish legislators (some of them from the PP) in the Lower House. 
Three years later, Spain’s Supreme Court overturned local-level veil-ban legislation by ruling 




Diffusion may be seen logically as an international process where external factors 
influence the domestic affairs of a state, and also as one subfield of linkage politics, where both 
internal and external determinants interact within a state. Thus, an appropriate explanation of 
diffusion should be given in terms both of the unit of analysis (e.g. states, individuals, or groups 
of individuals) and the social structures in which these units are embedded (e.g. world or 
regional systems). This research claimed that regional trends, such as a significant immigration 
of people of Muslim origin and regional/national security concerns after 9/11 within the 
normative framework of Europeanism were the “take-off point” for the sort of “bandwagon 
effect” that encouraged the spread of full-face Muslim veil bans in France, Belgium, Italy, and 
the Netherlands (Kingdon, 1998). In addition, various domestic factors, including right-wing 
political parties joined later by other parties and public opinion, were critical in shaping the 
internal processes leading to policy innovation in these four Western European countries. Yet, 
despite similar external developments, other Western European countries, including Norway, 
Denmark, and Spain, rejected national bans on full-face veils. These cases help demonstrate the 
significance of internal developments in the process leading to policy innovation. 
Overall, European governments may be legally entitled to limit women’s rights to wear 
Muslim veils, but banning them altogether may be an infringement of such individual rights as 
privacy, expression, personal identity, and freedom to manifest one’s religion, which are also 
European traditions. Muslim organizations argue that women should have the right to express 
themselves freely and not to be discriminated on the basis of the religion and the symbols they 
wish to wear in public places and these principles should not be impinged even when secularism 
is a state goal. Furthermore, policies that intrude directly on freedoms of expression and religion 
may be seen as a threat to the growing Muslim community in Europe and may eventually lead to 
a violent, albeit unintended backlash. Perhaps, reaction against these bans might have been 
different if they had been initiated from clearly centrist and immigrant-friendly political forces; 
had been applied equally to everybody who wore some type of facial coverage (helmets, 
yarmulkes, Sikh hats, etc.); and were clearly based on identification requirements, rather than on 
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